Envy is a rather complex and irrational emotion. In general, it is very difficult to obtain a measure of this feeling, but in an economical context envy becomes an observable which can be measured. When various individuals compare their possessions, envy arises due to the inequality of their different allocations of commodities and different preferences. In this paper we show that an equitable distribution of goods does not guarantee a state of fairness between agents and in general that envy cannot be controlled by tuning the distribution of goods.
Introduction
Envy is commonly defined as a feeling with a negative character that affects the social relationships making it rather complicated to define and, therefore, to measure. In economics this envy relation can be established as a phenomenon that emerges after interpersonal comparisons between agents. From this point of view envy can be considered as an economical observable that can be measured. We have developed a model with direct application in economics and with potential applications in physics, in particular measurement problems, which are related to conditional probabilities [11] . In this model we analyze the emergence of envy in a network of agents with individual preferences according to the restriction imposed by the preferences of the agents.
Previous investigations about similar systems are based on the development of a single model that describes the dynamics between agents as the dynamics of a network where the agents are in its nodes [2] [3] . An equivalent concept has been used by Donangelo et al. (2000) to model a network of trading agents as an interaction rule [4] . The exchange between agents consist of goods as well as information that can be quantified. In contrast to Donangelo's model, our motivation is to research interpersonal relations between the agents and to understand how the market motivates the evolution of these relations. This idea has been studied some years ago with a finite number of agents and a finite number of goods in economics without production; for instance , Schmeidler et. al. (1972) made an analysis of the influence of prices into the envy relation between agents [5] . This paper brings fundamental definitions to the concepts of fairness, but depends on some trading properties for the agents and prices, without consider the quality of goods or a fairness' index. We do not model envy as a network of trading agents related by envy relations. In contrast to Schmeidler's model, in the present case we analyze only the behavior of agents, not the way they trade, as a function of parameters of allocation and the way that agents compare in between. Because Emotions cannot be defined in a unique way, we develop a model that uses envy as a factor that modifies the conformation of a network based on information exchange. The exchange of information is related to the behavior of envy in the system. We suppose that an unidirectional exchange of information (each agent only observes her/his neighbors) is made through perfect channels, that means there is no noise in the transmission of information between agents. The existence of these channels ensure perfect comparisons, supposing that each agent has access to the content of information, i.e., the kind and number of goods, assigned to other agents. This situation can be imagined as a group of agents with television set, an instrument to observe what other agents have, making them able to compare their actual situation with the situation they look. A maximized allocation must be Pareto efficient where each agent is reaching the best stage with its endowment (See for example Feldman and Kirman [8] ). Otherwise, the individuals search for a bigger allocation with a bigger welfare, motivated for the possibility to get a bigger utility level reflected in their interpersonal comparisons-. Given the diffuse definition of the notion of envy, we present in the second part the fundamental concepts and theory from an economical point of view. In the third part we explain the fundamental schemes and ideas in the formulation of our model. In the fourth part we show the principal results and in the fifth part we explain the main conclusions obtained in this investigation.
Fundamental economical concepts
In economics the first concept of equity, as no-envy, is due to Foley (1967) [6] , introducing the concept of envy-free allocations: an allocation is equitable (or envy-free) if no agent prefers the bundle of another agent to his own. In this case we can say, there is a situation with fairness defined as no-envy.
The simplest problem of fairness is that of dividing a homogeneous commodity among a set of agents with equally claims on it. In this case, equal division (or equal income situation) is clearly the appropriate solution. If we want to have efficiency of this type of allocation and preserve its property of symmetry, the concept of fairness must be redefined. An equilibrium state is defined here as the moment when each person chooses the most preferred bundle in his budget set, and the choices exhaust the available supply.
An allocation is fair if it is envy-free and efficient [10] . An allocation in a walrasian equilibrium with equal-income is fair in this sense, but the converse no longer holds at all. A walrasian equilibrium is defined as a state where the aggregate excess demand (sum of all individual demands minus sum of all individual supplies) is equal to zero. So, if a bundle b i ′ is preferred by agent i to the bundle b i then the excess demand is different to zero. Hence, when the agents have equal initial endowments and equal possibilities in market, they can easily reach their maximal utility getting a fair trade [5] .
A distribution of goods is said to be envy-free when no one prefers anyone else's bundle of resources to her own. The suggestion here is that envy is not the psychological motivation for the concern with equality, but rather that, where a distribution in fact produces envy, this is a reason to doubt the fairness of the distribution. But envy in this context is a technical term for any situation in which someone prefers another's bundles of goods, and does not refer to the emotional syndrome with which this entry is concerned.
Model
For the construction of our model we define three basic elements: the first one is a set of different goods G located in a depot. Our second element is a set of agents with a list of preferred goods (called preference lists); and the third element is a set of individual 'baskets' where the agents can deposit the owned goods after she pick up them from the set of goods.
According to the individual preferences, the agents search them into the available set of goods. If the searched good is no more available, the agent starts to collect the second good from its list and so on. Each agent projects the goods from the set of goods into his/her basket. This situation is represented in fig. 1 : a group of cranes enter into a depot and take some stored goods (for example cakes, programs, movies, etc.); each good in the depot is classified and has an etiquette with a number. Thus in the depot there are N 'kinds' of goods. There is no production of goods and the number of agents along the process remains also constant. So, when the crane takes an object there is a depletion of one good in the depot. The amount of each kind of goods in the depot is called the number of goods (NG).
Here there are not only a single but a multiple set of goods that can be assigned to different agents. Furthermore each driver has particular individual preferences, absorbing a group of goods, of a determined kind, according to the individual preference c i . Each agent is allowed to pick up a maximal number of goods 'MaxNG'. The acquired goods are grouped in different states, according to their different characteristics.
In first a fist group of simulations we keep the number of goods NG equal for each kind of good in the depot. In a second group of simulations we introduce differences in the number of available goods depending on each kind of them . In this case, NG in each kind of goods, is not equally distributed; we define a distribution function for NG that depends on an amplitude parameter A. So, an equal distribution means a broad distribution amplitude A, while a narrow distribution is defined for a particular kind of goods. The N axis represents the kind of goods available for the agents and the NG axis the amount of elements in each kind of good. A is the parameter associated to the distribution amplitude of goods.
Following the rule of Knuth, we define the distribution of number of goods like a gamma distribution
where the parameter G 0 represent the point where the distribution is centered; so, if G 0 = 2 then the amount of goods of kind G = 2 is bigger than the amount of goods G = 2. In this equation the parameter A is the amplitude of the distribution, i.e. the variation of this parameter produces an equitable or inequitable initial distribution of goods in the depot. The gamma distribution has been used in a variety of settings, including the incoming distribution and production functions [14] and for this reason it is reasonable to introduce this function in our model. An example of the applied distribution is shown in figure (2). These three agents has a similar preference list, but one of them did not get the preferred good. The envy relation to the other agents is represented by the bold arrows.
After the distribution of goods the agents are allowed to take a look into the baskets of other agents and compare the owned goods with their preferences lists. Some agents are satisfied because they filled their preference lists, while other individuals did not get the goods they set in their preference list. These last ones search into the baskets of other agents for their preferred goods. This situation is represented in fig. 3 . Under this restriction, when an agent establishes visual contact with the basket of other agent, finding there the searched good, then an envy relation emerges. An agent is allowed to make several visual contacts f l in different times, i.e. the search options for each agent increase with the time (this is represented as the arrows around each agent), but only a limited amount of this visual contact represent an envy relation (bold arows). The search option f l increase with the time and is a variable in the present system. This variable have in the present model the same meaning as time in conventional Montecarlo simulations.
Our model could resemble a measurement process. In the notation we employ brackets for the representation of probabilities related to different agents. This notation is, however, used only for convenience and has in principle no relation with quantum mechanics. So, the projection of a good from the depot into the basket is represented by
where |O symbolizes the space of goods (total endowment of goods in the system) and |b the space of goods that are owned by the agent (the basket space). The projection operatorP is defined in the appendix at the end of this article.
We have interest in the case when each agent has a particular preference. Such preferences are represented by the so called 'space of preferences' |c k i , where the index i symbolizes the agent number and k the kind of preferences of this agent. A relation of orthonormality is established between the preference list and the basket for each agent. The acceptance or rejection of a good done for each agent is therefore given by,
This result represents the amount of goods obtained by each agent (and in general the determination of the total amount of goods) as a probability determined on the condition |c k i . By substituting equation (2) into equation (3) becomes a mechanism similar to the Born rule, which is commonly used for the determination of probabilities in physics [12] .
If eq. (3) is equal to zero it is possible to recognize a state of unfairness, because the agent never becomes what he/she is searching for. It is assumed that after the distribution of goods is done, the agents remain in the same space and that each agent is allowed to make "visual contact" with other agents. This particular case could be the origin of the envy relation between agents. So, when,
then a network of envy relations emerges. This network is represented as
where J ij pk (f l) is a metric of the network and E is the total envy relations, similar to a hamilton function. In this case, the hamilton function represents the envy in the system. (4). The nodes in the network are the agents-baskets and the edges between nodes the envy relation established from one agent into the basket of other agents.
The agents are rational in the way they choose the goods but are irrational in the way they compare themselves with other agents in the room. Furthermore, we assume that there is no particular difference between agents. Therefore, the search of goods into the baskets of her/his neighbors occurs in a random way, i.e. we define in our model a random network of comparisons between agents. The definition of this random graph is done by using the so called G(n, f l) model, that means, for a set of n nodes there are f l assigned edges [18] .
The number of nodes (agents) is constant. An envy network is conditioned to the projection of goods (assignation of goods) into the basket of the agent subjected to her/his preferences and emerges only when the system is out of a Walrasian equilibrium. Our model is not a typical optimization problem, where an optimal pay-off function (free energy for instance) represents a kind of equilibrium. Instead, the pay-off function (envy) is a measure of how far the system is from the equilibrium state (how much envy is there). We analyze the connectivity dependence on the assignation of goods and not on the number of agents (nodes) in the network [13] .
The fairness state, and not the topology of the network, is the main problem in this investigation. We have particular interest in the measurement of the amount of agents with envy. For this reason envy is redefined in our model as the total number of edges in the network averaged by the total number of nodes (agents), i.e
where NAg is the total number of agents. There is a fairness state when there are no connections between the nodes of the random network, i.e when E = 0. Otherwise, we recognize the emergence of an envy state.
This network represents the unidirectional exchange of information between agents, i.e., each agent looks into the basket of the other agents searching for the goods of her/his preference. Because they can look but not take out goods from the basket of other agents, emerges an envy relation due to interpersonal comparisons (or envy as no fairness).
Is it possible to improve the fairness by increasing the amplitude of the number of goods? At a first glance this is a plausible way to get a very small envy network between the agents. We want to probe this hypothesis making a variation of the amplitude of the distribution of goods A.
According to the conventional definitions of fairness, an allocation is fair when it is also symmetric [15] . Theoretically, when an asymmetry is presented two different states are generated: inferiority, because an agent unsatisfied wants the object or good that the other have (object of envy) and, on the other hand, superiority, because an agent possesses a good that the others want. In this case the distribution of goods is controlled in the object space as
Then, we require the times each agent looks their neighbors (used as a time parameter), f l as a variable and the number of kind of goods, NG (number of goods), which depends on the distribution amplitude of the number of elements for each kind of good, A. The envy state is therefore described as
The number of agents NAG that express envy is also an observable of the system. The advantage is the potential comparison of this observable with results obtained using interviews in real agents. This observable depends on the envy relation between agents and therefore is also dependent on f l and 
NG(A)
. This observable is defined as the average of the number of nodes with edges by the total number of agents NAg,
where n i is the number of nodes with envy relations.
Results
We performed simulations with 100 agents and 100 different kinds of goods. The total number of goods in the system is determined in a random way governed by the gamma distribution. Each agent can observe the basket of the neighboring agents, following the observation frequency parameter f l.
In a first simulation we fixed the maximal number of goods MaxNG = 10, keeping f l constant. The distribution of envy E as a function of NG is presented in fig. (5) . The envy relation grows according to the increment of the number of contacts assigned to each agent f l. For large amounts of allowed comparisons this result fits with an exponential function, suggesting that envy is a kind of a Boltzmann distribution among the network. This analogy makes possible to relate NG with a kind of temperature of the system.
A "non walrasian equilibrium state" is reached when the agents are allowed to explore all the baskets of the other agents. A fair state cannot be reached by increasing the supply of each kind of goods. This mechanism seems to be very clear in a society, where envy is the motor that ensures consumption. Innovation is related to the increment of the kind of goods supplied in the market. This increment shows that, contrary to an stagnation, there is still a tendency to increase the consumption. In other words, innovation makes the role of a "thermostat" in a consumption society.
The analysis of envy as a function of MaxNG is shown in fig. (6) . The increment of MaxNG generates a logarithmic increase of envy. This trend (the shape of the fit) does not depends on the number of comparisons allowed between agents. This is an empirical law that expresses how an increment in the allocated number of goods is not a guarantee for the improvement of fairness into a set of agents. Now, the problem is to implement this situation in an asymmetric distribution of goods. Varian (1974) has demonstrated the existence of fair allocations [10] . Also Kant (1797) was called for better allocations that lower or suppress envy [16] . As we shown in previous paragraphs, we search for a fair allocation by controlling the distribution of goods through the amplitude parameter A. The expected In order to test the role of the distribution of goods in the allocations we fixed the number of kinds of goods in 100 and repeated our simulations for envy as a function of f l and A. Given that the system is closed ( there are no change in the amount of goods and agents and no change in the preferences is introduced) then for f l → ∞ the system must reach an equilibrium state in the distribution of envious agents. This result is corroborated in fig.7 . In these simulations the effect of NG(A 0 ), the variation of the mean amount of each kind of good, and NG(A) in NAG is analyzed. The number of envious agents is again small when the number of goods of each kind is big. So for < NG(A) >≈ 300 the number of envious agents is around the 5% of the total number of agents, whereas for < NG(A) >≈ 100 the number of envious agents is approximately the 15% of the total number of agents. If the number of goods is infinite, and there are only few agents, then the number of envious agents is zero (in other words, envy state is equal to zero).
The variation of A has effect in the distribution function. This computation was made for NG(A 0 ) = 100 and 100 agents. For A = 5 the simulations show a very asymmetric and narrow distribution of envious agents, while for A = 80 the distribution of envious agents is significantly broader. Therefore, an uniform distribution increase the number of potential envious agents. This result also means that a non symmetric distribution boost the number of envious agents with particular preferences. We can interpret these graphics under the light of a planified economy, for example in a post-war system where the distribution of goods was rigorously controlled -and the number of goods is comparable to the number of agents in the system-and a capitalistic system. In the first case, no matter how uniform is the distribution of goods, the probability to find an envious agent never decreases. In the second case the narrow distribution of agents shows the way, how the initial distribution of goods can be adapted in order to satisfy the demand.
Conclusions and remarks
The construction of models of agents with particular features is hard to implement and set the problem presented in the Arrows impossibility theorem. Furthermore the comprehension of the emotional (subjective) component in a trading network is fundamental for the development of strategies in order to understand economical systems. The model presented here is a static portrait in a stage equivalent to a thermodynamic equilibrium state for a closed system where a set of agents, with individual preferences, are allowed to take objects from an initial distribution of goods. The results show, under which conditions the agents are not satisfied with the goods, they are able to acquire. Two equilibrium concepts arising, one from the economical theory and the other from the statistical mechanics. These equilibria are required for the construction of the present model. From an economical point of view, this system is far from equilibrium (defined as a walrasian one, where the sum of total demands must be equal to the sum of total supplies of the economy) when the agents develop interpersonal comparisons. Here, the number of interpersonal comparisons is equivalent to the magnitude of an envy field. From the physical point of view, the system reaches an equilibrium state (statistical equilibrium) when the agents are able to make enough interpersonal comparisons in order to explore the whole space of agents; after large number of interpersonal comparisons it is possible to quantify a distribution of envious agents that does not change in the time. Furthermore, the existence of a statistical equilibrium is tested by simulations, based on a Montecarlo method.
The number of envious agents depends on the number of possible comparisons and the amount of available goods in the system. For very few visual contacts between the agents the envy level is zero, and only after long interpersonal comparisons time the system reaches a stable envy state (remember: we do not consider time directly, but the parameter of frequency of comparisons f l as a measure of time). Also when the number of agents is small compared to the number of goods, the number of envious agents tend to be zero. These results imply a simple conclusion: agents with very good allocations and no visual contact with other agents does not have any chance to develop envy.
The control of the distribution over the number of goods is a way to control the envy state among the agents. However, the results obtained in the present calculations are quite contra-intuitive: a uniform distribution of goods does not decrease and restricts the number of envious agents. Contrariwise, a uniform distribution increases the distribution of the number of agents that feel envy.
This model appears like a caricature of a society of agents with feelings. We show what could happen when the information of the preferences of the agents is accessible and the interaction is fixed. In contrast, in a real scenario each agent can develop particular strategies in order to get the goods that they want and improve their welfare, formally represented by means of her/his own utility function. Furthermore, the opinion of an agent is not fixed and could change when is exposed to information that change her/his 'minds'. A good example is a magazine about mode and superstars, offering new goods that change the preferences of the people and the market supply. Therefore, an interesting perspective of this investigation could be consider an evolutive panorama. While in the system remain agents wanting to have the goods that other one have, we show in the present results the impossibility to reach the desired and ideal walrasian equilibrium state by controlling the distribution of goods in the depot, when the number of goods is limited. That means, an equilibrium in the statistics implies a non walrasian equilibrium. Models that far from the equilibria could be considered by introduce changes on the amount of goods or agents in the system, or with dynamical preferences sets for the agents, which changes able to adjust the available goods to the preferences lists for the different agents, improving the walrasian equilibrium.
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A Projection from a space of goods into the agents basket
The target is to obtain an explicit expression for the projection operator P , which represents the assignment of the boundles w. When a good is picked up it is possible to represent a 'creation' of a good inside the basket space of the agent. This action can be represented by the creation operator a † on the basket of the agent i, |b i . This creator operator changes the state of the basket.
There are no production or waste of goods and therefore when a good is picked up from the space of goods one element is eliminated in this space. This operation is represented by a 'destruction operator' on the space of goods a − 1 |O . So, when the agent 1 take a good from the space of goods one observe the following process,
The total amount of goods is conserved by this expression. Each creation and destruction operator is related to a particular agent with a particular preference. One supposes that there is no further absorption of the good, different as the absorption done by the agent (conservation of the total number of initial goods).By means of an iteration we want to explore the total distribution of the goods between the agents, under the assumption that goods are successively absorbed in this society. Taking the expression (A.1) it is possible to write the selection of goods by the agent number two, where N is the total number of agents in the system. It is possible to symbolize the absorbed goods by each agent as a † i |b = |b i .
If P i |O = |b i , then the projection operator from the goods space into the basket space is given by:
